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Henderson: Blended Sentencing in Montana

BLENDED SENTENCING IN MONTANA:
A NEW WAY TO LOOK AT AN OLD PROBLEM
Robert E. Henderson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

"40-year sentence for 15-year-old who killed father."'
2
"Additional charges filed in alleged gang murder."
'
"Flathead county attorney wants teen tried as adult.

3

The general perception is that juveniles are committing
more violent offenses and with greater frequency. Fueled by the
media, many believe that today's juvenile offenders are a new
breed of "super-predators."4 Yet the juvenile crime rate has
continued to drop since its all time high in 1993. 5 Because of

1. Michael Jamison, 40-year Sentence for 15-year-old who Killed Father,
MISSOULIAN, August 5, 2000, at B1.
2. John Stromnes, Additional Charges Filed in Alleged Gang Murder,
MISSOULIAN, March 18, 1999, at Al.
3. Ron Nash, Flathead County Attorney wants Teen Tried as Adult for Drowning,
MIsSOULIAN, August 19, 1999, at B2.
4. See SHAY BI.CHIK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHALLENGING THE MYTHS: 1999
NATIONAL REPORTS SERIES 1 (2000). The author explains that the term "super-predator"
was created by some researchers because of the increasing juvenile crime rate in the late
1980s and the expected increase of the juvenile population through-out the 1990s. Yet as
shown by the juvenile violent crime arrest rate, the average juvenile offender is far from
a "super-predator." See id; see also HOWARD SNYDER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
ARRESTS 1997 1 (1998) (visited Sept. 22, 1999) <httpJ/ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/qa007
.html.> (stating the overall juvenile arrest rate reached an all time high in 1996, before
declining in 1997).
5. See HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMuND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT at 62-63, 88 (1999) ("Serious violence
victimizations in the U.S. peaked in 1993 at 4.2 million, the highest level since the NCVS
began in 1973.... Between 1993 and 1997, the number of serious violent victimizations
with at least one juvenile offender dropped 33% from 1,230,000 to 830,000."); see also
Kim Brooks et al.,School House Hype: Two Years Later (visited Apr. 15, 2000)
<http'J/www.cjcj.org/schoolhousehype/ shh2.html.>; see also BILCHIX, supra note 4 at 2.
The author clarifies that although the juvenile violent crime rate reached an all time
high in 1994, it has been steadily decreasing since and in 1997 was at a level near that of
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this inaccurate perception, there is a desire to "get tough" on
juvenile offenders. 6
During the 1990's almost all states
amended their juvenile code to impose greater punishments on
juveniles who commit "adult crime."'
Montana was no
exception.
Montana has amended its juvenile code over the past two
decades to address the increasing seriousness of offenses
committed by its youth. In the late 1980's, the state legislature
amended the juvenile code to allow for easier prosecution of
older teens charged with deliberate homicide in order to protect
society.8 In 1997, the legislature revised the transfer statutes 9
in response to the fear of gang-related crime and passed the
Montana Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.'0
1989. See id.
6. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5 at 87-88. The authors point out that
throughout the 1980's and 1990's the public perceived juvenile crime as a serious
problem and the juvenile justice system as being too lenient with offenders. States
responded by passing more punitive laws, focusing on exclusion from juvenile
jurisdiction, transfer to adult court, and mandatory minimum sentences. More and more
states are treating juvenile offenders as adult criminals. See id.
7. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5 at 89. According to the Department of
Justice, the national trend has been to expand juvenile transfer laws, thereby limiting
the juvenile court's jurisdiction over serious offenses committed by juveniles. Between
1992 and 1997, all but three states amended thier juvenile code in one of three areas: (1)
Transfer provisions - 45 states have increased the availability of transfer to adult court
for juveniles who commit serious offenses; (2) Sentencing authority - 31 states have
expanded the number of options juvenile court judges have in determining a juvenile's
disposition; (3) Confidentiality - 47 states have passed new laws which remove
traditional juvenile court confidentiality from juvenile proceedings. Only Nebraska, New
York, and Vermont have not amended their juvenile code in one of the three areas. See
id.
8. See H. 470, 50th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1987). Then Attorney General, Marc
Racicot, a proponent of the amendment for easier prosecution, stated "at least [twenty]
homicides have been committed by teenagers within the last [eighteen] to [thirty-six]
months.... This is a very important piece of legislation that will allow authorities a
fighting chance .... "; see also In re Wood, 236 Mont.118, 127, 768 P.2d 1370, 1376 (1989)
("[Tihe classification found in § 41-5-206, MCA, based on age and seriousness of the
offense, is rationally related to the legitimate state objective of curbing homicides
committed by teenagers and protecting society from these violent offenders under both
the United States and Montana Constitutions.").

9 Every state has some statutory device of prosecuting juveniles who fall within
the juvenile system as adults. See MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
How JUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT 1 (1994); See generally discussion
infra Part II.B.
10. See S. 285, 55th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1997). The preamble to the Montana Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act stated:
"WHEREAS, the Legislature further finds that the State of Montana is in a
situation of rising crisis caused by the entry into the state of criminal street
gangs whose members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes
against the peaceful citizens of their neighborhoods; and
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The Act focused on retribution, deterrence, and punishment for
gang-related offenses, rather than rehabilitation.
In 1995, the Montana Legislature took a different approach.
Instead of sending more children to adult court, the Legislature
modernized the juvenile code to provide an alternative option to
youth court judges when dealing with delinquent youths - a
concept known as blended sentencing. 1 This alternative, the
Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act (hereinafter "EJPA"),
allows a youth court judge to impose both a traditional juvenile
disposition and an adult sentence. Under the EJPA, the youth
remains under the protection of the youth court, thereby
retaining all the protections and benefits accorded to juveniles,
2
yet receives the possibility of an adult sentence.'
In 1997, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the EJPA in the case of In the Matter of
S.L.M. 13 (hereinafter "S.L.M."). The Court concluded that the
EJPA violated both the Equal Protection Clause 14 and the Right
of Minors Clause 5 of the Montana Constitution because of the
possibility that a juvenile might receive a greater sentence than
an adult would receive for committing the same offense. 16 In
response to this ruling, the Montana Legislature passed a
substantially similar version of the EJPA in 1999, adding
language that limited the length of an Extended Jurisdiction

WHEREAS, these activities, both individually and collectively, present a clear
and present danger to public order and safety and are not constitutionally
protected; and
WHEREAS, the Legislature wishes to deter the growing influx of violent
criminal street gangs and criminal street gang-related activity in its
communities and to protect Montana citizens from the terror associated with
violent criminal street gangs."
See id. at Preamble.
11. See H. 380, 54th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-51101 to -1105 (1995)).
12. The United States Supreme Court has held that juveniles must be afforded
many of the same Due Process protections that adults have. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) (holding juveniles must be given notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to appellate review in
adjudicatory proceedings.); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring that
the level of proof in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings is beyond a reasonable doubt);
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (holding juveniles are protected under the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
13. 287 Mont. 23, 951 P.2d 1365 (1997).
14. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 26, 951 P.2d at 1367.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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Juvenile disposition. 17 In addition to amending the EJPA, the
1999 Legislature also amended the preamble and the
1
Declaration of Purpose of the Montana Youth Court Act. 8
The
1999
amendments specifically
addressed the
deficiencies found by the Montana Supreme Court in S.L.M.
This comment will address the constitutionality of the 1999
version of the EJPA and, more broadly, the 1999 Amendments
to the Montana Youth Court Act. 19 Part II briefly describes the
evolution of the Juvenile Court System. Part III demonstrates
how the EJPA is an alternative to the traditional juvenile justice
process. Part IV and V chronicles the tenuous relationship
between the Montana Legislature and the Montana Supreme
Court as seen by the Court's holding in S.L.M. and the
Legislature's response to the decision. Part VI and VII describe
how the 1999 Amendments alleviate the Equal Protection and
Right to Minors deficiencies found in the EJPA. This comment
concludes that blended sentencing statutes, specifically
Montana's
Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction statute, are
appropriate alternatives in addressing the problems associated
with juvenile offenders. Blended sentencing offers peace of mind
to citizens without losing sight of the fact that most delinquency
problems can be adequately addressed within the juvenile
system.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

A. Juvenile Court Movement
In 1899, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act created the first
juvenile court.20 Prior to this act, juveniles were treated as

17. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999). The 1999 Amendments added the
phrase "the combined period of time of a juvenile disposition... plus an adult
sentence... may not exceed the maximum period of imprisonment that could be imposed
on an adult." See generally discussion infra Part IV.
18. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102(2) (1999). The goals of the Montana Youth
Court Act were amended to read: "[T]o prevent and reduce youth delinquency through a
system that does not seek retribution but that provides: immediate, consistent,
enforceable, and avoidable consequences of youths' actions; a program of supervision,
care, rehabilitation, detention, competency development, community protection for the
youth before they become adult offenders; and, in appropriate cases, restitution as
ordered by the youth court." See id. (emphasis added).
19. See generally discussion infra Part V.
20. See JOHN C. WATKINS, JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLEGAL
COMMENTARY ON AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 43-73 (1998).
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adults, being incarcerated with adults when convicted. 21 The
new juvenile court introduced a special court for delinquent
youths, separate from adult proceedings. 22 Following the lead of
Illinois, several state legislatures quickly passed legislation that
implemented juvenile courts. 23 The idea behind juvenile courts
was to concentrate on the rehabilitative possibilities that existed
in minors, emphasizing an informal court structure.2 Under
this model, juveniles were not viewed as criminals, but as
troubled youths in need of supervision. Because of this "childsaving"25 belief, most did not see the need to impose
constitutional protections upon the juvenile court.
During the 1950's and 1960's, scholars began to question the
Although the
means by which juveniles were treated. 26
philosophy of juvenile courts was still seen as benevolent, the
amount of arbitrariness that existed within the court raised
several constitutional questions. 27 Beginning in 1967, the
United States Supreme Court began providing juveniles with
constitutional due process protections. 28 In re Gault,29 the
seminal juvenile law case, involved a young boy who was
arrested for making crank phone calls to his neighbor.30 Neither

21. See Kenneth A. Schatz, Juvenile Justice: Reflections on 100 Years of Juvenile
Court, VT. B.J. & L. DIG. at 50 (Dec. 1998).
22. See id.
23. See ANTHONY M. PLATr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
1, 139 (1977) ("The Illinois act was considered a prototype for legislation in other states
and juvenile courts were quickly established in Wisconsin (1901), New York (1901), Ohio
(1902), Maryland (1902), and Colorado (1903)."); see generally HERBERT H. Lou,
JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 23-25 (1927).
24. See generally Lou, supra note 23.
25. PLAIT, supra note 23 at 3 ('The term 'child savers' is used to characterize a
group of'disinterested' reformers who regarded their cause as a matter of conscience and
morality, serving no particular class or political interests.").
26. Because the purpose of the juvenile court was to protect the child, due process
protections afforded to criminal defendants was deemed unnecessary. However, this
could and often did lead to great disparities between dispositions between juveniles
accused of the same offense. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Schatz, supra
note 21 at 50.
27. For example, Justice Fortas, author of United States v. Kent, 383 U.S. 541
(1966) understood that the juvenile court was "rooted in [a] social welfare philosophy"
and not in determining criminal responsibility. See id. at 554. However, Justice Fortas
disagreed that the objectives of the juvenile court - guidance and rehabilitation - were
sufficient reasons to invite "procedural arbitrariness" into the United States Constitution
when dealing with juveniles. See id; see also Gault,307 U.S. at 28 (Justice Fortas stating
"Under our Constitution the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.").
28. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
29. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
30. See id. at 4.
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the boy nor his parents received notice of the charges, assistance
of counsel, or an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 31 After
being adjudicated a delinquent youth, the judge ordered the
young boy to be committed to the Arizona Industrial School at
32
Fort Grant for an indeterminate period not to exceed six years.
The maximum penalty for an adult convicted of the same offense
was two months in jail or a fifty dollar fine. 33 Because of this
inequality between youths and adults, the United States
Supreme Court held that juveniles were entitled to adequate
notice of charges, the assistance of counsel, the privilege from
self-incrimination, and the right to confront witnesses during
34
delinquency proceedings.
Following Gault, the United States Supreme Court handed
down several cases affirming that juveniles should have the
35
right to avail themselves to the United States Constitution.
Today, with a few exceptions, 36 most juveniles are afforded the
37
same protections as adults when facing criminal charges.
B. TransferLaws
Almost everyone agrees that not all juveniles should be
treated within the juvenile justice system. All states have some
mechanism that allows the transfer of juveniles from youth
court to the adult court. 38 Waiving jurisdiction by a juvenile
court relinquishes the juvenile court's jurisdiction over a child
and permits the juvenile offender to be criminally prosecuted as
an adult. 39 The policy behind most juvenile transfer statutes is
31.
32.

See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 7-8.

33.

See CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE

86 (1998).
34. See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
35. See, e.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that the required
standard of proof in delinquency proceedings is beyond a reasonable doubt); see also
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
United States Constitution applies to juvenile proceedings).
36. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that
juveniles do not have a constitutional right to jury trials in delinquency proceedings);
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984) (holding that juveniles may be subjected to
"preventative detention" while awaiting trial).
37. See SNYDER & SICKMUND supra note 5 at 87-88.
38.

See MELISSA SICKMuND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, How JUVENILES GET TO

CRIMINAL COURT 1 (1994); see also CHARLES M. PUZZANCHERA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DELINQUENCY CASES WAIVED TO CRIMINAL COURT 1 (2000).
39.

See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

4-1 (1997).
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that serious delinquent behavior needs to be punished more
severely, such as the possibility of longer incarceration, then
40
what is normally available within the juvenile justice system.
Transfer statutes fall into one of three categories: judicial
41 Judicial
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, or statutory exclusion.
waiver statutes give the youth court judge the discretion to
transfer juveniles to adult court.42 The decision to transfer is
usually based on the age of the offender, the seriousness of the
43
alleged offense, and the juvenile's past criminal behavior.
Prosecutorial discretion statutes vest the prosecutor with the
authority to file charges in juvenile court or adult court. 4 These
types of statutes are also known as "concurrent jurisdiction"
statutes. 45 Lastly, statutory exclusion statutes exclude juveniles
charged with certain enumerated felonies from juvenile court
jurisdiction. 46
40. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal
Responsibility and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 80 (1997)
("Although legislatures and courts transfer youths to criminal court so that they may
receive longer sentences as adults... chronic property offenders constitute the bulk of
juveniles judicially waived in most states....").
41. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, "[aill
states allow juveniles to be tried as adults in criminal courts under certain
circumstances. A juvenile's case can be transferred to criminal court for trial in one of
three ways..." See SICKMUND, supra note 38 at 1.
42. See id.; See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.12. 100 (Michie 1999) ("If the court finds at
a hearing on a petition that there is probable cause for believing that a minor is
delinquent and finds that the minor is not amenable to treatment under this chapter, it
shall order the case closed. After a case is closed under this subsection, the minor may
be prosecuted as an adult").
43. See SICKMUND, supra note 38 at 3.
44. See SICKMUND, supra note 38 at 1. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-501(B),
which states:
"The county attorney may bring a criminal prosecution against a juvenile in
the same manner as an adult if the juvenile is at least fourteen years of age
and is accused of any of the following offenses:
1. A class 1 felony;
2. A class 2 felony,
3. A class 3 felony in violation of an offense in chapters 10 through 17,
4. A class 3, 4, 5, or 6 felony involving the intentional or knowing infliction of
serious physical injury or the discharge, use of threatening exhibition of a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrument;
5. Any felony offense committed by a chronic felony offender; or
6. Any offense that is properly joined to an offense list in this subsection."
45. See SICKMUND, supra note 38 at 1-3; see also PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA
SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT
JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE at 1, 3 (Nov. 1998).
46. See SICKMUND, supra note 38 at 1-3; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 137.707(1)(a)
(1998) ("when a person is charged with aggravated murder.... or an [enumerated]
offense [and]... is 15, 16, or 17 years of age at the time the offense is committed,... the
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Over the past decade, the number of juveniles transferred to
adult court has almost doubled. 47 The increased availability of
transfer was a result of the "get tough on juvenile crime" policy
by state legislators. 48 Yet, the increasing use of transfer
statutes to address juvenile delinquency is contradictory to the
underlying philosophy that youthful offenders are amendable
through rehabilitation. 49 Transferring large amounts of youths
to criminal court fails to achieve the goals of the juvenile justice
system and creates substantial and unforeseen consequences in
50
the process.
Criminal theorists agree that for criminal sanctions to be
51
effective, the sanction must be swift, severe, and certain.
Research indicates that the juvenile system is more swift when
imposing sanctions for delinquent behavior then adult court.52
Further, most children who are transferred to adult court are
treated less harshly and serve less time than they would have
served in the juvenile system. 53 In other words, "U]uvenile
courts are more likely to impose immediate sanctions than adult
courts, and thus can have a more profound effect on juvenile
54
offenders."
One serious unforeseen consequence of transferring youth to

person shall be prosecuted as an adult in criminal court").
47. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5 at 170. The authors point out that
between 1996 and 1997, the number of delinquency cases judicially waived to criminal
court grew 47%.This percentage is somewhat deceiving, due to more juveniles being
charged directly in adult court and bypassing the juvenile system completely. The actual
increase of juveniles being processed in adult court may be somewhat closer to 73%. See
id.
48. See TORBET & SZYMANSKI, supra note 45 at 1; see also SNYDER & SICKMUND,
supra note 5 at 88; See Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer to Juveniles of Criminal
Court: Does it Make a Difference?, 42 Crime and Delinquency 171, 172 (Apr. 1996).
49. Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role
of Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 401 (1998).
50. See id.
51. See A. Javier Trevino, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE LAW 18-20 (1996) (citing CESARE
BONESANA, AN ESSAY ON CRIME AND PuNIsHmENT (1794)).
52. See Klein, supra note 49 at 402.
53. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5 at 176; see also Klein, supra note 49 at
402. But cf Jeffrey Fagan, Juvenile Justice Policy and Law: Applying Recent Social
Science Findings to Policy and Legislative Advocacy, in CRIMINAL LAW AND URBAN
PROBLEMS 1999, at 395, 406 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. CO-OOOU, 1999) ("[Aldolescents convicted in the criminal court were more likely to be
incarcerated... than youths adjudicated in the juvenile court. While incarceration is
more likely for youths tried as adults, the length of punishment is no different on either
side of the jurisdictional divide.").
54. See Klein, supra note 49 at 402.
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criminal court is the likelihood of increased recidivism. 55
Scholars argue that transferring a child to criminal court is
more detrimental to both the youth and society because the child
is more likely to re-offend once released than if the child would
56
have been treated within the juvenile system.
It is not a surprise that recidivism increases with transfer.
When a juvenile is transferred to criminal court the juvenile
loses the ability to access specialized treatment programs which
exist within the juvenile system.5 7 Once transferred, many
juveniles are incarcerated with adults.5 8
In doing so, the
chances of the juvenile being the victim of a violent or sexual
assault is great, thereby creating a need for the youth to be
violent and aggressive in order to protect him or herself.5 9 The
consequence of transfer, though not surprising, surely should
make society question the desire to send more and more children
to adult court receiving adult consequences.
Yet, as many problems exist within the transfer process,
55. See Bishop, supra note 48 at 183. In a comparison study between transferred
youth and non-transferred youth, juveniles who were not transferred to adult court were
shown to have a lower recidivism rate. See id.; See also Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C.
Feld, The End of the Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 449, 492 (1996).
56. See Bishop, supra note 48 at 183 ("The transfer group recidivated at a higher
rate than the non-transfer group. This was true of all seven classes of offense that
resulted in [transfer]. Despite being incarcerated for longer periods of time, transferred
youth nonetheless committed more offenses [when released]."); see also Defusing the
Myth: Prosecuting Children as Adults Doesn't Work to Decrease Juvenile Crime (visited
Apr. 22, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org/congress/kids/html>. "One study, comparing New
York and New Jersey juvenile offenders, shows that the rearrest rate for children
sentenced in juvenile court was twenty-nine percent lower than the rearrest rate for
juveniles sentenced in the adult criminal court." Id.
(citing Jeffery Fagan, The
Comparative Advantages of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism
Among Adolescent Felony Offenders 1, 21, 27 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the American Civil Liberties Union.)).
57. For example, children in the juvenile system normally have an opportunity to
get psychological and educational counseling, as well as job training which decrease the
chances of re-offending later in life. See Klien, supra note 49 at 403.
58. See id. at 404-05.
59. See id at 403 (citing Martin Frost et al., Youth in Prison and TrainingSchools:
Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 Juv. & FAMILY
CT. J. 1, 9 (1989)) ("Studies show that sexual and physical assault of juveniles is much
more likely in adult facilities. While 36.7% of juveniles in juvenile facilities report being
victims of violent attack, 45.7% of juveniles in adult facilities report such abuse. In
addition, sexual assault of a juvenile is five times more likely in an adult facility than in
a juvenile one. Also, beatings by staff are nearly twice as likely for juveniles in adult
facilities than for those housed in juvenile facilities, and attacks with weapons are nearly
50% more common [in adult facilities].... [Dlue to the fear that most children feel in
adult jails, the suicide rate for juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons and jails is eight
times higher than for children in juvenile facilities.").
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juveniles do not have a constitutional right to be treated within
the juvenile court system. 60 Juveniles do not have the right not
to be tried in adult court.61 Juvenile courts are, by their very
62
nature, created by legislative acts.

The Montana Constitution mandates "one supreme court,
district courts, justice courts, and such other courts as may be
provided by law."63 By creating youth courts designed specially

to address the unique needs of juveniles, the legislature merely
exercised its inherent legislative power.
Accordingly, the
legislature also has the inherent legislative power to redefine
jurisdiction of youth courts without violating the constitutional
rights of juveniles.
The end result in most situations however, is a decision to
transfer based on vague beliefs about juvenile delinquency.
Depending on the facts of each case, transfer of jurisdiction may
not always be the most beneficial decision. Many cases involve
an incident where transfer may be an option, but the unique
situation of the youth may warrant youth court jurisdiction. In
such cases, an intermediate alternative needs to be available.
Because of this dilemma, blended sentencing has emerged as
that intermediate alternative.
III. FRAMEWORK OF MONTANA'S BLENDED SENTENCING STATUTE
A. Blended Sentencing
The concept of blended sentencing is a hybrid solution to the
problem of juvenile crime.r
It normally provides more
alternatives than traditional methods of juvenile sentencing. 65
It affords judges the ability to provide treatment to delinquent
minors, but also provides the state with meaningful recourse if
the minor chooses not to rehabilitate. One form of blended
60. See Klein, supra note 49 at 390.
61. See id.
62. See In re Wood, 236 Mont. 118, 122, 768 P.2d 1370, 1373 (1989) (noting that
"several United States' Court of Appeals decisions have held that a state's treatment of
youths outside of the criminal system is not an inherent right and may be redefined or
restricted by state legislation, so long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is
involved.") (citations omitted).
63.

MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 1.

64. See Lisa Stansky, More and More States Are Telling Teens: If You Do Adult
Crime, You Serve Adult Time, 82 A.B.A. J. 60, 64-5 (1996).
65. See generally PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME, RESEARCH REPORT, July 1996.
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sentencing imposes both a juvenile disposition and an adult
sentence. Other options include reverse waiver,6 6 contiguous
68
sentencing, 67 and criminal-inclusive sentencing.
Extended jurisdiction juvenile statutes, like Montana's
EJPA, attempt to combine the best of the juvenile justice system
and the adult system, by imposing both an adult sentence and a
juvenile disposition. By doing this, the rehabilitation goals of
the juvenile system are retained, while still providing the State
with adequate consequences needed to address chronic and
serious delinquent behavior.
The first Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile statute was
recommended by the Minnesota Task Force on the Juvenile
Justice System ("Task Force") in 1992.69 In response to rising
juvenile crime, the Task Force was empowered to determine
problems within the juvenile justice system and make
recommendations accordingly.
The Task Force turned to
blended sentencing after determining that not all serious
70
juvenile offenders should be transferred to adult court.
One of the Task Force recommendations was "a graduated
juvenile justice system" designed to create an intermediate
category between the traditional juvenile disposition and adult

66. Reverse waiver statutes are statutes that require minors who are convicted in
adult court to serve their sentence under the juvenile court's jurisdiction. For example,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-2503 (1999) states: "The district court, in sentencing a youth
adjudicated in district court pursuant to 41-5-206, shall:
(a) impose any sentence allowed by the statute that established the penalty for
the offense of which the youth is convicted as if the youth were an adult and
any
conditions
or
restrictions
allowed
by
statute;
[or]
(b) retain jurisdiction over the case until the criminally convicted youth
reaches the age of 21 .... "
67. Contiguous sentence statutes are statutes that require juveniles to serve a
portion of their sentence in a juvenile facility, completing the sentence in an adult
facility once he or she reaches majority. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 61.079
("[a]fter a child sentenced to [Youth Department of Corrections] becomes 16 years of age
but before the child becomes 21 years of age, the commission may refer the child to the
juvenile court that entered the order of commitment for approval of the child's transfer
to the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice .... ").
68. When a minor is convicted of an offense in district court and receives both a
juvenile disposition and a criminal sentence. This is similar to Montana's statute, but in
Montana, the minor stays within the youth court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 211.073 (1) (1998) (allowing dual jurisdiction of criminal and juvenile code stating, "the
court may, in a case when an offender.., has been transferred to a court of general
jurisdiction,... invoke dual jurisdiction of both the criminal and juvenile codes....").
69. See Kathryn A. Santelmann & Kari L. Lillesand, Extended Jurisdiction
Juveniles in Minnesota:A Prosecutor'sPerspective, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1303, 1304
(1999).
70. See id.
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sentences. 71 The Task Force created a new category of juvenile
disposition, designed to give juveniles "one last chance" within
the juvenile system.7 2 This new juvenile disposition - called
Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution ("EJJP") - provided
for both the imposition of an adult sentence and a juvenile
disposition allowing a juvenile to retain the benefits of the
juvenile system, but also providing the State with adequate
sanctions if the juvenile did not reform his or her delinquent
73
behavior.
The Task Force believed EJJP was unique in its approach to
juveniles. At the time, most blending sentencing statutes 74 did
not provide adequate procedural safeguards to juveniles or were
not blend sentencing models at all. Instead, the statutes were
merely different forms of waiver statutes. 75 The EJJP model, on
the other hand, guaranteed juveniles all of the adult criminal
76
procedure safeguards, but continued to treat them as juveniles.
Under the Task Force's reasoning, if the youth is given the same
protections of an adult, then the juvenile court could impose
both an adult and juvenile sentence. 77
The Minnesota
in 1995.78
recommendation
Force's
Task
the
adopted
Legislature
B. Extended JurisdictionProsecutionAct
In 1995, the Montana Legislature passed its first version of
the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act. 79

This Act was

modeled after the Minnesota statute.80
The EJPA is a
mechanism which allows a Youth Court judge to retain
jurisdiction over a minor who is alleged to have committed an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult, and at
disposition, impose both a juvenile disposition and an adult
71. See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile
Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 956, 1038 (1995).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1038.
74. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.045, 54.04, 54.11 (West 1986 & Supp.
1995) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1992).
75. See Feld, supra note 71 at 1039.
76. See id. at 1040.
77. See id. at 1041-42.
78. The Minnesota Legislature enacted the Task Force's recommendation as MINN.
STAT. § 260.126 (1995).

79. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-5-1101 thru -1107 (1995) (renumbered §§ 41-51601 thru -1607).
80. See H. 380, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (statement by sponsor Jeanette
McKee, representative).
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sentence. 8 ' The adult sentence is stayed upon the condition that
the youth complies with the court's order and does not re82
offend.
The court must designate the juvenile's case an Extended
Juvenile Jurisdiction Prosecution [hereinafter "EJJP"] to treat a
juvenile under the EJPA and not under traditional mechanisms.
EJJP designation occurs in three ways.8 3 First, if the juvenile is
at least 14 years of age, the county attorney may request an
EJJP designation hearing, and at the hearing, the court may
designate the case as an EJJP.84 For the court to designate a
case an EJJP, the judge must find, by clear and convincing
evidence, that an EJJP designation would best serve public
safety. 85 The second way a case may be designated an EJJP is
when the juvenile is alleged to have committed either a
"transferable felony,"86 an offense that would be a felony if
committed by an adult, or the juvenile allegedly used a firearm,
and the State designates the case an EJJP in the delinquency
petition.8 7 Lastly, a case may be designated an EJJP, if during a
motion to transfer the case to adult court, the judge decides that
81. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604 (1999).
82. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(l)(a)(ii) (1999).
83. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1999).
84. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(a) (1999).
85. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1603(3) (1999); The factors that are considered in
determining public safety are: the seriousness of the offense; the culpability of the youth,
including the level of planning while carrying out the offense; the youth's prior record of
delinquency-, the youth's past willingness to undergo treatment; the adequacy of
available disposition within the juvenile justice system. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-51606(1) (1999).
86. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(i) (1999). The offenses that are eligible
for EJJP are the same offenses listed in the juvenile waiver statute MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-5-206(1). See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(i) (1999). A complete list of offenses
which may be subject to EJJP designation are: Mitigated Deliberate Homicide, Assault
on a Peace Officer or Judicial Officer, Attempted Mitigated Deliberate Homicide,
Negligent Homicide, Arson, Aggravated Assault, Assault with a Weapon, Robbery,
Burglary or Aggravated Burglary, Possession of Explosives, Criminal Distribution of
Dangerous Drugs, Criminal Production or Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs, Use of
Threat to Coerce Criminal Street Gang Membership or Use of Violence to Coerce
Criminal Street Gang Membership, Escape, attempt, as defined in MONT. CODE ANN.
§45-4-103, or accountability, as provided in MONT. CODE ANN. §45-2-301 or any offense
enumerated in MONT. CODE ANN. §45-5-206 (1)(b), not including Assault with a Weapon
or Escape.
Under the 1999 Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act, any offense that is punishable by
death or life imprisonment or when a sentence of 100 years may be imposed may no
longer be designated an EJJP. This Amendment removes the more serious offenses
which are likely to be transferred to District Court under most circumstances. See MONT.
CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602 (1999).
87. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b) (1999).
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retaining Youth Court jurisdiction would best serve public
safety.88 Once designated an EJJP, the youth court retains
jurisdiction of the youth to enforce the disposition of the case.8 9
Upon adjudication, the youth court imposes both a juvenile
disposition and an adult sentence.9 0 The adult sentence is
stayed upon the condition that the youth does not violate the
provisions of the juvenile disposition order or commit a new
offense. 9 1 If the juvenile does violate the conditions of his or her
dispositional order or commits a new offense, the youth is taken
into custody and a hearing is held on a allegations of the
violation. 92 If the judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the violation or new offense did occur, the judge may
93
impose the adult sentence.
The juvenile receives procedural due process protections
both before the case is designated an EJJP 94 and upon alleged
violation of the juvenile disposition. 95 For example, during a
revocation hearing of an EJJP, the youth is entitled to adequate
notice, the right to present witnesses of his behalf, the right to
96
cross-examine witness, and the assistance of counsel.
Notwithstanding these procedural due process protections, in
1997, several juveniles challenged the EJPA on constitutional
grounds. 97
IV. IN THE MATTER OF S.L.M.
In In the Matter of S.L.M., 98 the Montana Supreme Court
consolidated five cases on appeal to determine the
constitutionality of the EJPA statute.9 9 In each incidence, the
juvenile was designated an Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile

88.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(c) (1999).

89. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(2) (1999). If the case is designated an EJJP,
the youth is not transferred to District Court and the Youth Court retains jurisdiction.
90. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604 (1999).
91. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(a)(ii) (1999).
92. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605 (1999).
93. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605(2)(b) (1999). However, the judge does not
have to impose the adult sentence; the judge may also continue the stay and place the
youth on probation or impose a different disposition under the Code.
94. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-5-1603, 1607 (1999).
95. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-5-1605, 1607 (1999).
96. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605(2) (1999).
97. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 26, 951 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1997).
98. 287 Mont. 23, 951 P.2d 1365 (1997).
99. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 26, 951 P.2d at 1367.
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Prosecution. 0 0 All the juveniles received similar dispositional
orders and sentences. 1 1 For example, Strider Moore was
arrested for selling $150.00 worth of marijuana to an undercover
police officer. 10 2 The court committed Moore to the Department
10 3
of Corrections as a delinquent youth until the age of nineteen.
The court also entered, but stayed, a sentence of ten years for
10 4
the charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs.
All five youths challenged the EJPA as an unconstitutional
violation of Equal Protection, the Right of Minors, Due Process,
10 5
and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Montana Constitution.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court determined that the
EJPA violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Right of
Minors Clause of the Montana Constitution, refusing to address
06 or Due Process 10 7
either the alleged Double Jeopardy'
violations.
In S.L.M., the Montana Supreme Court analyzed the EJPA
under the Equal Protection Clause and the Right of Minors
Clause of the Montana Constitution. 0 8 The Court concluded
that for the EJPA to be constitutional, the State was required to
show two things: there was a compelling state interest to
100.
101.

See id.
See id.

102. See id.
103. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 26-27,
104. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 27, 951 P.2d
105. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 26, 951 P.2d
106. See, S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 40-42, 951
concurring) (arguing that EJPA should have

951 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1997).
at 1367.
at 1367.
P.2d at 1376-77 (Trieweiler, J., specially
been ruled unconstitutional on double

jeopardy grounds because it imposed multiple punishments for the same offense).
Justice Trieweiler reached this conclusion using the reasons expressed in the dissenting
opinion by Justice Leaphart in State v. Zabawa, 279 Mont. 307, 311, 928 P.2d 151, 154
(1996). See id.
However, § 41-5-1604 provides that a juvenile receives "a single judgment consisting of"
a juvenile disposition and an adult sentence. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(a) (1999)
(emphasis added). Under EJPA, juveniles receive a single disposition consisting of two
halves. The disposition may not exceed the amount of time an adult would have received
if convicted of the same offense. This type of disposition does not constitute multiple
punishments for a single offense, but instead, a single punishment consisting of several
parts. It is the author's opinion that under the 1999 Amendments EJPA does not violate
the Double Jeopardy provisions of either the United States or Montana Constitution.
107. Although the Court refused to address the alleged Due Process violations, in
dictum the Court seemed to indicate that the 1997 Amendments to the EJPA statute
cured any past deficiencies stating "the 1997 legislature amended the EJPA to provide
for more procedural due process in revocation of stay proceedings.... If the State were
to initiate revocation of stay proceedings against any of the appellants, the 1997
amendments would insure their benefit." S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 29, 951 P.2d 1365, 1369;
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605 (2) (1999).
108. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 32-39, 951 P.2d 1365, 1370-75 (1997).
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designate juveniles under the EJPA, and the EJPA was
designed to enhance the protection of minors. 10 9 The state failed
to establish either. 110
Ruling the Extended Jurisdiction Prosecution Act
unconstitutional on two grounds, Equal Protection and the
Rights of Minors, the Montana Supreme Court articulated its
view that the EJPA treated juveniles who were designated EJJP
harsher than their adult counterparts."' In situations where an
adult and a juvenile were charged with similar crimes, an adult
would receive an adult sentence and a juvenile would receive a
juvenile disposition. A juvenile designated an EJJP, on the
other hand, receives both the juvenile disposition and an adult
2
sentence."1
According to the Montana Supreme Court, when a juvenile
under the EJPA receives a juvenile disposition in addition to an
adult sentence, the juvenile was subjected to a potentially longer
sentence than what an adult convicted of a similar offense would
receive." 3
The Court felt this framework violated equal
protection on its face. 1 4 Additionally, the statute clearly did not
enhance a minor's protection within the juvenile system, but
5
instead, reduced the protection available to a minor."1
V. THE 1999 AMENDMENTS TO THE EXTENDED JURISDICTION
PROSECUTION ACT

In response to S.L.M., the Montana Legislature revised the
Youth Court Act in 1999.116 The 1999 revisions substantially
amended the EJPA."1v The amendments fall into one of three
major categories: revision of Montana's Youth Court Act
Declaration of Purpose, removal of certain offenses from EJPA
classification, and changes in the maximum amount of time
109. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 35, 951 P.2d at 1373.
110. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 39, 951 P.2d at 1375.
111. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 36, 951 P.2d at 1373.
112. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(a) (1999).
113. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 39, 951 P.2d 1365, 1375 (1997).
114. See id. at 36, 951 P.2d 1373.
115. See id. at 39, 951 P.2d 1375.
116. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999).
117. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) ("An act... revising the Extended
Jurisdiction Prosecution Act; providing that the act does not apply to certain offenses;
providing that the combined time of sentence under an Extended Jurisdiction
Prosecution may not exceed the time of imprisonment that an adult could receive under
an adult prosecution; . . . clarifying that a sentence under the Extended Jurisdiction
Prosecution Act is a single sentence .... ").
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available for imprisonment under the EJPA.118

The first major category, the amendments to the Montana
Youth Court Act's Declaration of Purpose, changed the focus of
the EJPA. 119 The amended Declaration of Purpose states, "[the
Montana Youth Court Act must be interpreted] to prevent and
reduce youth delinquency through a system that does not seek
retributionbut that provides: immediate, consistent, enforceable,
and avoidable consequences of youths' actions; [and] a program
of

supervision,

care,

rehabilitation,.

. .

and

community

protection for [the youths] before they become adult
offenders ...120
This amendment addressed the Court's
concern in S.L.M. that the EJPA went beyond mere
rehabilitation and injected a "specter of retribution" into the
juvenile justice system. 121 The Legislature never intended for
the Youth Court Act to be interpreted as using retribution as the
primary means of managing youthful offenders. 122 The concept
of EJPA was to provide Youth Court Judges with stronger
sanctions to impose against juveniles, yet still allow the juvenile
justice system to work its "rehabilitative magic;" and not to
provide judges with a mechanism to "lock-up" juveniles for an
extended period of time.
In amending the stated purpose of the Youth Court Act, the
Montana Legislature articulated its view that the expressed
reason for Montana's youth court system is to consistently
provide juveniles with a program of meaningful, yet serious
consequences arising from a youth's anti-social behavior. 123 In
amending the EJPA, the Montana Legislature has reaffirmed its
belief that extended juvenile jurisdiction is an effective way to
provide rehabilitation and treatment. 24 The enactment of the
EJPA was not meant to impose retribution into the juvenile
118.

See generally id.

119. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1999).
120. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102(2)(a)&(b) (1999) (emphasis added).
121. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 36, 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (1997).
122. See EJPA Revision Hearing on S. 243 Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary,
56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter EJPA Revision Hearing] (statement by Senator
Fred Thomas, sponsor) ("[The EJPA and] the longer sentence is to encourage the youth
to perform the judgment and end up with only a juvenile record.").
123. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102(2) (1999).
124. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) ("WHEREAS, extending juvenile
jurisdiction with the possibility of an adult sanction for failure to comply with conditions
of a stayed sentence or for additional criminal behavior by the youth has been shown to
be an effective incentive in other states to rehabilitate juveniles to keep them out of the
adult correctional system and allow them to pay restitution, finish treatment, and
complete their education ....
").See id. at Preamble.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

17

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
61 [2000],
Iss. 2, Art. 3

354

Vol. 61

justice system, but merely to provide incentives for juveniles to

reform.

125

The second major category of change in the 1999 version of
EJPA was the removal of certain offenses, which were
previously available for EJJP designation. 126 In an effort to
reaffirm rehabilitation as the goal of the EJPA, the 1999
127
Legislature removed certain serious offenses from eligibility.
The Montana Legislature realized some juveniles were not
candidates for meaningful rehabilitation and therefore not
candidates for EJJP designation. Offenses punishable by death,
life imprisonment, or a sentence of 100 years were no longer
eligible for EJJP designation. 128 This Amendment removes
offenses like deliberate homicide, 129 sexual intercourse without
consent, 3 0
and
aggravated
kidnapping' 3 1 from EJPA
eligibility. 32 If the genuine purpose behind the EJPA is to focus
on rehabilitation, and not retribution, then limiting the EJPA to
a narrow group of felonies reinforces that objective.
Offenses that are still available for EJPA designation after
the 1999 revisions are typically the serious property offenses.
Normally, these offenses warrant substantial and severe
consequences, but do not warrant total removal from the
juvenile system. By removing the serious and violent offenses
like deliberate homicide, EJPA focuses its objective on
rehabilitation and not on offenses where rehabilitation is
unlikely to occur. 33 The 1999 version of the EJPA focuses on
125. See EJPA Revision Hearing, supra note 122. In a statement by Missoula
County District Judge John Larson, a proponent of the 1999 EJPA revisions he stated,
'[The EJPA] gives the juvenile an extra chance. It also gives the judge and the probation
officers and extra lever to encourage the juveniles to perform that judgment." Id. He
went on to state, "[t]he key to the juvenile system has always been to fashion more
individual solutions for the young people." Id.
126. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999).
127. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999). Section 41-5-1602 was amended to
read that the EJJP designation applies to all offenses if the offense would be a felony if
committed by an adult "except an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment or
when a sentence of 100 years could be imposed .... " Id.
128. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1602(1)(b)(i) (1999).
129. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1999).
130. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1999).
131. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-303 (1999).
132. A complete list of offenses which may no longer receive the benefit of EJJP are:
deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnapping, sexual assault, sexual intercourse without
consent, incest and sexual abuse of children.
133. But see Stevens H. Clarke, IncreasingImprisonment to Prevent Violent Crime:
Is It Working?, POPULAR GOVERNMENT, Summer 1994 at 16-24. (arguing that the
seriousness of the offense is a poor predictor of recidivism); see also Eric Lotke & Vincent
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those juveniles who are accused of serious offenses where a
traditional juvenile dispositions will provide meaningful
rehabilitation, likely to reduce recidivism, but where a more
severe sanction needs to be a possibility. The removal of certain
offenses from the EJPA furthers the expressed rehabilitative
purposes of the Youth Court Act.
The final amendment the 1999 Legislature made was to
limit the maximum period of imprisonment available under the
EJPA. The Montana Legislature addressed two separate
concerns of the Montana Supreme Court by this amendment.
First, that the EJPA is not a "secret weapon" used by
prosecutors and judges to impose longer sentences than would
be available under traditional adult or juvenile sentences.
Second, to specifically address the Court's concern that,
conceivably, a juvenile's total sentence under the EJPA could be
longer than an adult would receive if convicted of the same
offense. 134

Section 41-5-1604, MCA, addresses this specific deficiency.
This section states that "the combined period of time [of] a
juvenile disposition.., plus an adult sentence... may not
exceed the maximum period of imprisonment that could be
imposed on an adult convicted of [a similar] offense . ... "135 The
addition of this language negates the Court's fear of a juvenile
under EJPA receiving a sentence that could exceed a similar
adult sentence. Through this addition, the legislature intended
to erase any Equal Protection violations the Montana Supreme
Court found in the former version of the EJPA.136
The purpose of the EJPA is to give the youth court judge
ample discretion when imposing an EJJP disposition. Although
the youth court judge must impose both an adult sentence and a
juvenile disposition, the judge is free to adjust the sentence in
accordance with the circumstances of the crime. The combined
period of time may not exceed the maximum an adult would

Schiraldi, An Analysis of Juvenile Homicides: Where They Occur and the Effectiveness of
Adult Court Intervention, NATIONAL CENTER OF INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

(visited on July 17, 2000) <httpJ/www.ncianet.orgncia/ waiver.html> (arguing that no
correlation exists between high transfer rates and low juvenile homicide rates,
concluding that transfer statutes do not deter serious and violent juvenile crime.).
134. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 39, 951 P.2d 1367, 1375 (1997).
135. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(b) (1999).
136. See S. 243, 56th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) ("WHEREAS, the maximum extension
or period of jurisdiction may not exceed the period of an adult sentence without violating
equal protection."). Id. at Preamble.
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receive if convicted of a similar offense. 137 This nullifies any fear
that juveniles are being treated more harshly than their adult
counterparts. Even if the court finds that the conditions of the
juvenile disposition were violated, the judge is not required to
impose the stayed adult sentence. 38 Instead, the judge may
continue the current sentence, impose a new juvenile
disposition, or revoke the disposition and impose the adult
13 9
sentence.
It is important to note that the recent revisions to EJPA
were not a knee-jerk reaction to the decision of S.L.M. The
amendments to the EJPA attempted to intelligently deal with
the constitutional deficiencies the Montana Supreme Court
found in the EJPA. The Montana Legislature clearly expressed
its desire to continue with blended sentencing in Montana,
believing the EJPA is a meaningful and thoughtful way to
handle certain juveniles accused of enumerated offenses.
Blended sentencing is a valid and acceptable alternative to
traditional methods of sentencing that attempts to address the
problem of juvenile crime. The EJPA provides judges with a
mechanism to handle juveniles that are receptive to
rehabilitation, but are in need of an extra incentive not to reoffend.
The 1999 version of EJPA is Montana's democratic answer
to the "youthful offender."
According to the Montana
Legislature, the staying of an adult sentence has been an
effective incentive in other states to prevent recidivism while
providing rehabilitation to juveniles that keeps them out of the
adult correctional system. 40 The Legislature believes this type
of blended sentencing will provide the appropriate level of
accountability while still according the needed rehabilitation to
certain juveniles without violating a minor's constitutional
4
rights.' '
In order for the EJPA, as amended in 1999, to be
137. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604(1)(b) (1999).
138. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605(2)(b)(i) (1999).
139. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1605(b) (1999).
140. See EJPA Revision Hearing, supra note 122. According to by John Larson,
Missoula County District Court Judge: 'The data [from Minnesota] shows that this [type
of blended sentencing] is filling the gap between juveniles who commit serious offenses
and are transferred into the adult system and juveniles who are not." Judge Larson
went on to state: '[the data from Minnesota shows that this is working and very few of
the sentences are actually revoked and go into the adult system." Id.
141. See EJPA Revision Hearing, supra note 122 (statement by Senator Halligan:
'Since the youth court provides better services, [EJPA] is worth looking [into].").
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constitutional it must survive a strict scrutiny equal protection
analysis, as well as a Rights of Minors analysis under the
Montana Constitution. The constitutionality of the "new" EJPA
has not yet been addressed by the Montana Supreme Court.
However, as shown in Part VI and V, the 1999 version of the
EJPA will survive any constitutional attack.

VI. EQUAL PROTECTION
Under the EJPA, the judge is required to impose both an
adult sentence and a juvenile deposition. 14 2 According to the
Montana Supreme Court, imposing both a criminal sentence and
a juvenile disposition is an infringement of a juvenile's physical
1 43
liberty, a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution.
To satisfy this burden, the state was required to show a
narrowly tailored compelling state interest, with no other less
burdensome alternatives available to accomplish the same
145
objectives. 144 In S.L.M., the state failed to meet this burden.
In S.L.M., the Montana Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the Youth Court Act was solely for
rehabilitational goals. 14 The 1997 Youth Court Act, according
to the Court, was no longer "strictly for rehabilitation." The
purpose and goals of the 1997 Youth Court Act focused more on
community protection and deterrence of juvenile crime instead
47
of rehabilitation. 1
The Court stated that the EJPA could not rely on the
doctrine of parens patriae'4s to treat juveniles differently than
adults. 149 The traditional doctrine of parens patriae applies to
the paternalistic rational of the State to act as the guardian of
the juvenile, as juveniles cannot take care of themselves. 150 The
142. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604 (1999).
143. The Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to the Equal Protection violation
because the infringement involved a fundamental right. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23,
34, 951 P.2d 1365, 1372 (1997). A juvenile's physical liberty is a fundamental right. See
In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940 (1984).
144. See In re Wood, 236 Mont. 118, 124, 768 P2d 1370, 1374 (1989) (citing Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972)).
145. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 39, 951 P.2d at 1375.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Parens patriae is the "principle that the state must care for those who cannot
take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their
parents." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
149. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 39, 951 P.2d at 1375 (1997).
150. See In re C.S., 210 Mont. 144, 146, 687 P.2d 57, 59 (1984).
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original purpose of the juvenile justice system was to provide a
forum where the State could act as parenspatriae.151 Yet under
the EJPA, the juvenile is not treated solely as a juvenile and the
paternalistic rationale does not apply. 152 The doctrine of parens
patriae is not a justification for treating juveniles more harshly
153
than adults.
The EJPA requires a strict scrutiny analysis because it
infringes upon a fundamental right. Absent a compelling state
interest, the statute violates equal protection. The compelling
interest must be narrowly tailored with no less burdensome
54
alternative available which accomplishes the same objectives.
The statute must pass this test to be constitutional. 55
According to the Montana Supreme Court in S.L.M., the
previous version of the EJPA did not meet this burden. Under
the 1999 amendments, however, the EJPA passes a strict
scrutiny analysis.
The state has several compelling state
interests in using the EJPA. Furthermore, the statute is
narrowly tailored and no other alternatives can accomplish the
goals of the EJPA.
A. Compelling State Interest
The infringement of a juvenile's physical liberty is justified
under the EJPA for a number of reasons. First, juveniles
require supervision and rehabilitation, second, treatment within
the juvenile system exists to an extent not available within the
adult system, and lastly, keeping delinquent minors within the
juvenile system reduces recidivism.
The Montana Supreme Court has stated in earlier cases
that a juvenile's right to physical liberty is not absolute and

151. See id.
152. See S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 39, 951 P.2d at 1375.
153. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 39, 951 P.2d 1365, 1375 (1997); see also In re
C.S., 210 Mont. at 145-46, 687 P.2d at 58-60. In 1984, the Montana Supreme Court
found that juveniles could be treated differently than adults within the juvenile justice
system because the two groups were not similarly situated. Based on the doctrine of
parens patriae and the separate goals of the juvenile system and the adult system, a
juvenile receiving a harsher sentence than an adult could receive charged with the same
offense was not a violation of Equal Protection. See C.S. at 146-47, 687 P.2d at 58-59.
154. See In re Wood, 236 Mont. 118, 124, 768 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Mont. 1989) (holding
that when a law infringes on a fundamental right, the Court must apply a strict scrutiny
analysis). A strict scrutiny analysis requires the Government to prove that the statute
was justified by a compelling state interest, which is narrowly tailored and no "other
avenues less burdensome are available in which to accomplish the objective." Id.
155. See Wood, 236 Mont. at 124, 768 P.2d at 1374.
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must be balanced against his or her need to be supervised. 5 6
Strong state interests exist in treating juveniles outside the
criminal system and keeping them within the juvenile justice
Accordingly, a juvenile's physical liberty may be
system.
1 57
restricted and defined by state legislation.
As stated earlier, the EJPA seeks to provide rehabilitation
in the juvenile system, not retribution. 158 The goal behind
rehabilitation is prevention. Deterring juveniles from becoming
59
adult offenders has always been a legitimate state interest.
In 1984, In the Matter of C.H.,160 the Montana Supreme
Court held that treating minors differently than adults did not
violate Equal Protection, even though treating them differently
than adults infringed on the juvenile's physical liberty.' 6 1 In
C.H., the state demonstrated two legitimate, compelling state
interests: 62 first, "to rehabilitate youthful offenders by providing
for their care, protection and wholesome mental development
before they become adult criminals;" 163 second, "to substitute a
program of supervision, care and rehabilitation and remove the
1
element of retribution for a youth who has violated the law." '
The majority in S.L.M. found these compelling interests
invalid reasons to infringe upon the physical liberty of
juveniles. 165 The compelling reasons set forth in C.H. were no
longer valid under the 1995 Youth Court Act due to the "specter
of retribution" that the EJPA injected into the juvenile
system. 166 Because of the 1995 amended Declaration of Purpose,
the Youth Court Act focus had changed: 167 the goal under the

156. See In re C.H. 210 Mont. 184, 203, 683 P.2d 931, 941 (1984).
157. See Wood, 236 Mont. at 123, 768 P.2d 1374 (citing Woodard v. Wainwright, 556
th
F.2d 781, 785 (5 Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088 (1978) (explaining that juveniles
do not have an inherent right to be treated within the juvenile system and state
legislation may restrict and redefine treatment "so long as not arbitrary or
discriminatory classification is involved.")). Wood, at 122, 786 P.2d at 1373.
158. See Mont. Code. Ann. § 41-5-102(2) (1999).
159. See C.H., 210 Mont. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941 (holding that "a juvenile's right to
physical liberty must be balanced against her right to be supervised, cared for and
rehabilitated" and is sufficient to warrant an infringement upon the fundamental right
of physical liberty).
160. 210 Mont. 184, 683 P.2d 931 (1984).
161. See In re C.H., 210 Mont. at 203, 683 P.2d at 941 (1984).
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. In re C.H., 210 Mont. at 201, 683 P.2d at 941.
165. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 36, 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (1997).
166. See id.
167. See id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

23

360

REVIEW
LAW
MontanaMONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
61 [2000],
Iss. 2, Art. 3

Vol. 61

Youth Court Act was no longer rehabilitation, but retribution.
The "specter of retribution" in the 1995 Youth Court Act
distinguished C.H. from S.L.M.16 8 Under the 1995 Amendment,
the Act was "much more preventive, if not punitive" 169 in nature,
instead of the rehabilitative goals of the pre-1995 Youth Court
Act.
The Court in S.L.M. concluded that rehabilitation was no
longer the main focus of the Youth Court Act. 170 But as the
recent amendments demonstrate, rehabilitation is the purpose
of the Act, and not retribution.' 71 EJPA provides the state with
the means to accomplish this objective by encouraging
prosecutors and Youth Court judges to address delinquency
within the juvenile system while the youth is still receptive to
72
treatment.
The purpose of Montana's Youth Court Act has returned to
rehabilitation. Juveniles may once again receive the treatment
and guardianship needed, thereby reducing the chances of them
becoming adult criminals. The element of retribution has been
removed and replaced with "a program of supervision, care,
[and] rehabilitation." 73 The compelling state interests under
the C.H. analysis are once again valid under the 1999 Youth
Court Act.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See discussion supra Part IV.
171. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102 (1999); See also discussion supra Part V.
172. Many experts believe that most juveniles are receptive to rehabilitation and
most causes of juvenile delinquency are reversible. See Klien, supra note 49 at 406; See
also Laureen D'Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile
Offenders is not a Panacea,2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 285 (1997) (arguing that
although serious violent crime peaks between the ages of sixteen and seventeen, it
dramatically decreases after the age of twenty, "[tiherefore, offenses at a young age do
not indicate future criminality, but rather suggest that rehabilitation can be
effective. .. ."); See also SHAY BILCHIK, U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM
INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996 5 (1997). Bilchik argues that juvenile transfer
should be used sparingly and with caution. Bilchick cites the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges for the proposition that:
"Juvenile delinquency jurisdiction should be to age 18 in every state. In most
cases, juvenile offenders can be effectively maintained in the juvenile justice
system. In rare instances, the most violent offenders cannot be rehabilitated
within the juvenile system and should be transferred for adult prosecution.
However, the decision to transfer should be only be made by the juvenile or
family court judge."
Id. (quoting Violent Juvenile Offenders: Police Perspectives,CAMPAIGN FOR AN EFFECTIVE
CRIME POLICY: PUBLIC POLICY REPORTS: A SERIES OF REPORTS ON MAJOR ISSUES IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICe, July 1996 at 1, 7.).
173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-102(b) (1999).
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The increased availability of treatment programs within the
juvenile justice system is another compelling state interest in
the designation of minors under the EJPA. Juvenile system
opportunities, such as treatment, education, and counseling are
simply not available for adult offenders. Juveniles routinely
receive counseling and group therapy for personality or social
disorders, and education is usually mandatory. 174 The opposite
is true in the adult system. In the adult system, therapy and
education is not always available, or even sufficient. 175 As such,
the state has a strong compelling interest in keeping as many
youths within the juvenile system as long as possible.
The mechanism where the State can transfer a juvenile
from youth court to district court under certain circumstances transfer statutes 176 - provides another reason why there needs
to be an intermediary between youth court and adult court. As
discussed supra, Montana has the ability to transfer certain
youths to district court, 77 removing any possibility for the
juvenile receiving treatment within the juvenile system.
Juveniles who are transferred are treated as adults. Using the
transfer statute is not always an appropriate answer to
delinquency.
The goal of the EJPA is to keep juveniles within the juvenile
system while providing adequate sanctions for the delinquent
behavior. Most of the juveniles who will be subject to EJJP
designation are the same juveniles who could be transferred to
adult court. In fact, one way for a juvenile to be designated
EJJP is when the judge determines, during a transfer hearing,
that public safety is best served by keeping the juvenile in the
juvenile system. Without a blended sentencing alternative
available, the state will be forced to transfer the youth to adult
court. By doing this, the possibility of treatment is forever
removed from the youth. This also dramatically increases the
likelihood that the youth will reoffend. 7 8
As discussed
previously, scholars argue that transfer to criminal court
actually aggravates short-term recidivism. 79
Without the
EJPA, the youth would not have the opportunity to reform,
instead he or she will be treated as an adult, in adult court,
174.
175.
176.
177.
17.
179.

See
See
See
See
See
See

Klien, supra note 49 at 403.
D'Ambra, supra note 172 at 296.
discussion supra Part II.B.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-206 (1999).
Bishop supra note 48, at 183-84; see also Fagan supra note 53, at 408-09.
id.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2000

25

362

LAW
REVIEW
Montana MONTANA
Law Review, Vol.
61 [2000],
Iss. 2, Art. 3

Vol. 61

receiving adult time, becoming adult criminals.
Concerns other than punishment (i.e. rehabilitation, mental
development of the youth, etc.) are addressed when the court
determines the proper sentence for a delinquent youth. Some
juveniles will be accused of offenses that are both "transferable"
and within the EJPA. When this occurs, the EJPA allows for a
program where the state can impose traditional juvenile
sanctions, but also impose a condition to insure compliance from
the youth.'8 0 Without this available "middle ground," the state
will be left with no choice except to transfer jurisdiction to
district court. Under this scenario, if a youth is transferred,
juvenile focused treatment is no longer an option. If the goal is
to lower recidivism, not allowing a form of blended sentencing
will preclude a state from achieving that goal.
As the Court stated in In the Matter of C.H., the
constitutional authority for treating juveniles differently than
adults is the juvenile's need to receive rehabilitation, care,
protection, and mental development to reduce the chance of
them becoming adult offenders.' 8 ' These reasons are sufficient
state interests to treat juveniles differently under the EJPA and
not under traditional juvenile dispositions.
B. Narrowly Tailored
Strict scrutiny analysis requires the statute to be narrowly
tailored in accomplishing its objective. The revised EJPA is
narrowly tailored in the type of youths eligible for EJJP
designation. For a youth to be designated an EJJP case, the
youth must be accused of a narrow group of enumerated
offenses, 8 2 satisfying certain criteria, with the county attorney
requesting an EJJP designation. Because of such a narrow
focus, the EJPA will not be frequently used. The EJPA will only
be invoked with juveniles who have been accused of serious
offenses and are believed to have a chance of re-offending, but
are still receptive to rehabilitation.
The EJPA statute is narrowly tailored, designed to achieve
rehabilitation in the youth and limited only on those youths who
are most susceptible to treatment. EJPA does only what is
necessary to achieve its desired goal: rehabilitation of the youth
combined with incentives to ensure compliance.
180.

See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-1604 (1999).

181.
182.

See In re C.H., 210 Mont. 184, 203-04, 683 P.2d 931,941 (1984).
For a complete list of EJPA eligible offenses see supra note 86.
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C. No Less Burdensome Alternative Available
It may be true that there are less burdensome alternatives
within the juvenile system to handle the average juvenile
offender. For most juvenile offenders, the EJPA is not the best
alternative. However, the EJPA is not designed for average
juveniles.
The EJPA focuses on a select few who have
committed serious offenses. Although an offense may be serious
enough to warrant transfer to adult court, the judge believes the
delinquency is best addressed through the EJPA.
There are no other less burdensome alternatives that
provide the state with the opportunity to treat juveniles within
the juvenile system, but still enable judges to provide incentives
for the youth to not re-offend.
VII. RIGHT OF MINORS

The Montana Supreme Court held that juveniles who are
treated under the EJPA are treated unfairly and more harshly
than their adult counterparts. 8 3 This unfair treatment violated
the Right of Minors Clause of the Montana Constitution. In so
holding, the Court required the state to show both a compelling
state interest and that the EJPA was designed to enhance the
protections of minors. The Court may have been in error in
requiring both a compelling state interest and the showing that
the interest enhanced the protections of minors. However,
under the 1999 amendments, it is clear that the state has a
legitimate interest in designating juveniles as EJJP cases, and
such a designation enhances the status of being a minor.
Under the Montana Constitution, all minors must be
afforded the same fundamental rights as adults, unless
precluded by laws which enhance their protection. I84 Laws may
be passed that limit the fundamental rights of minors if a clear
showing is made that the law enhances the youth's protection. 85
When a law infringes on a fundamental right of a minor, the
state is required to prove the infringement was designed to

183. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 36, 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (1997).
184. Article II, Section 15 of the Montana Constitution states: "The Right of Persons
not Adults. The rights of persons under 18 years of age shall include, but not limited to,
all the fundamental rights of this Article unless specifically precluded by laws which
enhance the protection of such persons."
185. See Montana ConstitutionalConvention 1971-1972, Committee ProposalNo. 8:
Bill of Rights Committee, at 635-36 (1972) [hereinafter COMMITTEE PROPOSAL].
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provide added protection to the youth. 186
Some legal scholars argue that the Right of Minors Clause
imposes a four-part infringement test. 8 7 However, in S.L.M.,
the Montana Supreme Court interpreted the clause to require a
two-prong infringement analysis.
The state must show a
compelling state interest to justify the infringement, and the
compelling state interest must afford greater protections to the
88
minor.
This additional requirement actually affords juveniles more
rights and protections than adults, contrary to the plain
language of the Montana Constitution. The plain language of
the Right of Minors provision requires either a compelling state
interest or that the law enhances the protection of the youth, not
both.
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitution on the Bill
of Rights Committee wanted to insure minors the same
fundamental rights of adults, not more. 189 If a law violated a
fundamental right of the youth, the law was required to enhance
the status of being a youth. 90 Thus, the Montana Supreme
Court's interpretation of granting minors enhanced protection to
youths appears to be in conflict with the intention of the
delegates
and the plain language of the Montana
Constitution.' 9 '
Under a traditional analysis of equal protection for adults, if

186. See S.L.M. 287 Mont. at 35, 951 P.2d at 1373.
187. See generally Matthew B. Hayhurst, Comment, Parental Notification of
Abortion and Minors' Rights Under the Montana Constitution, 58 MONT. L. REV. 565,
578-81 (1997) ("[Wlhen the right of a minor is contested under the Montana
Constitution, the court applies a four-part test: (1) analyze the nature of the minor's
right affected by the disputed legislation; (2) determine whether the legislation infringes
on that right; (3) if an infringement is found, balance the right that has been invaded
against the rights of the minor that are allegedly enhanced by the legislation; and finally
(4) determine whether the invasion is justified by a sufficiently compelling state
interest.").
188. See S.L.M. at 34, 951 P.2d at 1372.
189. See COMMITEE PROPOSAL, supra note 185 at 636; see also Montana
Constitutional Convention Comm'n, Montana ConstitutionalConvention Study No. 10:
Bill of Rights 301-05 (1972).
190. See COMMITTEE PROPOSAL, supranote 185 at 635-36.
191. See COMMITTEE PROPOSAL, supra note 185 at 636 ("[tlhis is the crux of the
committee proposal: to recognize that persons under the age of majority have the same
protections from governmental and majoritarian abuses as do adults.") (emphasis added);
but cf In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. at 35, 951 P.2d at 1373 (1997) (the court stating that "if
the legislature seeks to carve exceptions to this guarantee, it must not only show a
compelling state interest but must also show that the exception is designed to enhance
the rights of minors.").
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the law infringes upon a fundamental right, and the state can
show a compelling state interest that is narrowly tailored, the
law does not violate equal protection. 192 Montana minors are
guaranteed the same fundamental rights as adults. 1 93 If a law
involving minors is determined not to violate equal protection,
the Rights of Minors Clause 194 should not require additional
protections merely because the law encompasses minors.
Instead, the Clause requires the state to show that the law was
designed to enhance the protection of minors, if the state wants
to treat minors differently than adults. It is logical to assume
that if a law is found not to violate equal protection under a
traditional analysis, the mere status of being a minor does not
provide greater protection under the plain language of the
Rights of Minors Clause.
The protection of minors' fundamental rights was the intent
of the drafters to the Montana Constitution. 195 The drafter's
were not attempting to provide more protection to minors, but
merely the same protection that adults were given. 196 It was
understood, however, that there were some circumstances where
the rights of minors had to be limited. That limitation,
according to the Montana Constitution, was acceptable if the
limitation improved the treatment of minors. 197 In other words,
if a law did not violate a fundamental right, the law did not need
to enhance the protections of minors, because the minor was still

192. See discussion supra Part VI.
193. See supra note 184.
194. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 15.
195. An examination of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention transcripts
demonstrates that the delegates wanted to make sure that all of the basic rights afforded
to adults would be afforded to persons under the age of majority. Delegate Monroe
stated to the committee "[w]hat this section is attempting to do is to help young people to
reach their full potential. [We do not want them to lose any rights that any other
Montana citizen has, and this is specifically what this particular section is attempting to
do." 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 1749-52 (1981).
196. See id. at 1752. Delegate Dahood stated: "All we're going to do is make sure
that the young boys and the young girls, the young men, the young women, prior to
reaching the age of majority, are going to know that during that particular period of
maturity they shall have all the basic rights that are accorded to all citizens of the State
of Montana, and they are going to be better trained to be more responsible citizens." Id.
197. See id. at 1751-1752. The provision "except where specifically precluded by
laws which enhance the protection for such persons," was inserted because the delegates
recognized that minors could not be treated exactly like adults. According to the
delegates, there were times where laws would need to be passed which limited the right
of minors. One example used by Delegate Monroe - the drinking age of 19 - need to
exist because such a law enabled minors to become responsible members of society. See
id. at 1751.
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being afforded the same fundamental rights as an adult. 198 The
state must treat minors and adults equal unless treating them
differently enhances the protections of being a minor.
According to the Montana Supreme Court, the EJPA was
unconstitutional unless the state could show that it enhanced
the protection of minors. 199 Applying this analysis to the 1999
Amendments of EJPA, the state is required to demonstrate a
legitimate interest that increases the protection of youth beyond
what is required in a traditional equal protection analysis.
The 1999 version of the EJPA no longer violates equal
protection because of the revision to the EJPA statutes and the
sufficient compelling state interests involved. However, under
the current Rights of Minors interpretation, that alone is
insufficient. The question is whether the EJPA enhances the
protections of minors who are designated EJJP and continues to
demonstrate a compelling state interest.
As discussed
previously, the goal of the EJPA is to keep minors within the
juvenile system where treatment and rehabilitation can be
provided, but also to allow for adequate recourse to ensure the
youth does not re-offend. This goal is achieved by reducing
recidivism, allowing for treatment, and avoiding the transfer of
minors to district court.
The availability of treatment within the juvenile system
enhances the minor's rights because they are accorded with
programs that will reduce recidivism and decrease the likelihood
that they will become adult offenders. Minors under the EJPA
are not treated as adults, but instead as juveniles in an
environment where their behavior may be modified to conform
with societal norms.
Protections of the youth are also enhanced because the
EJPA will be used an alternative to the "transfer statute."200
Some juveniles need more strict consequences then were
traditionally available in youth court. The EJPA imposes the
necessary consequences of delinquent behavior, but also
continues to provide delinquent minors with needed treatment.
Without the EJPA as an alternative, the state is forced to
transfer certain juveniles to adult court because the availability
of adequate sanctions do not exist within the juvenile system.
198. See id. at 1751. In one example provided by Delegate Monroe, Article II,
Section 15 would not prevent juveniles from receiving procedural due process
protections, merely because it is was a minor who was arrested. See id.
199. See In re S.L.M., 287 Mont. 23, 35, 951 P.2d 1365, 1373 (1997).
200. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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Providing a means of retaining youth court jurisdiction
enhances a youth's protection because the youth court can
render adequate treatment and rehabilitation, where the adult
court cannot. This result clearly enhances the protection of
minors.
The EJPA provides the State with alternative methods of
addressing delinquent youths. In its purest form, as Montana's
statute shows, the EJPA provides troubled juveniles with the
ability to stay within the protection of the youth court system,
getting all the protections and benefits of that status. Without
statutory provisions like the EJPA, the State has no ability to
keep a juvenile in the youth court's jurisdiction due to the
severity of the offense and age of the offender.
Under the 1999 revisions to the EJPA, juveniles rights are
protected to an extent greater than previously available. The
ability to remain within the youth court's jurisdiction provides a
youth with benefits and protections not available in the adult
system. This ability is the core of enhancing the protection of
juveniles. EJPA clearly shows a compelling state interest that
also enhances the right of minors. The 1999 version of EJPA
does not violate Article II, Section 15 of the Montana
Constitution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Montana Legislature has chosen blended sentencing as
a beneficial option to combat juvenile delinquency. In 1997, the
Montana Supreme Court found that option unconstitutional
under the Montana Constitution. The Legislature responded by
amending the EJPA. Those amendments cured any previous
constitutional deficiencies in the EJPA.
The Court may have been correct in determining that the
EJPA violated the constitutional rights of minors prior to the
1999 Amendments. But as it has been shown, those deficiencies
have been corrected. The EJPA, as amended in 1999, will
survive any constitutional attack. The compelling state interest
under an equal protection analysis is the need to encourage
juveniles to reform their delinquent behavior. Juveniles need
the rehabilitation programs of the juvenile justice system.
Rahabilitational programs which decrease the likelihood of
future adult criminal behavior are generally unavailable within
the adult system.
Similarly, the EJPA enhances the protections of minors by
providing a mechanism where delinquent behavior can be
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addressed within the juvenile system, avoiding transfer to adult
court. The EJPA is likely to reduce recidivism more consistently
than any other juvenile disposition option currently available.
In ruling the EJPA unconstitutional, the Court removed a
useful tool that provided the state with an alternative of dealing
with juveniles who were established delinquents, but not serious
enough to warrant their total removal from the juvenile justice
system.
Blended sentencing combines both the belief that juveniles
need help and should not be treated like adults, and the belief
that juveniles who commit more serious, violent offenses, need
to face serious sanctions for their behavior. The juvenile "superpredator" may or may not exist in today's world. However, there
is no correlation between juveniles who commit serious felonies
and juveniles who are amendable to treatment. Because the
seriousness of the offense is such a poor predictor of future
criminal behavior, juveniles who commit an isolated serious
offense may be more amendable then juveniles who commit
several non-serious felonies. 201 The juvenile system works. All
juveniles, even those who commit serious felonies, should be
given an opportunity to use it.
Research shows that most juveniles can be rehabilitated. 202
Research also shows recidivism is lower when juveniles are not
transferred to adult court. 20 3 As it has been stated previously,
transfer may increase, not decrease the likelihood of a juvenile
re-offending. The EJPA is an intermediate or "third system,"
designed to handle serious, repeat, and violent juvenile
offenders. The EJPA offers a "graduated juvenile system"
providing the youth with the benefits of the juvenile system
where rehabilitation and treatment is still the purpose, but also
201. See Clarke, supra note 133 at 20 (explaining that the more serious the current
offense is, the less likely the offender will recidivate and if he does, the less serious the
subsequent offense will be); see also D'Ambra, supra note 172 at 299 n.154. The author
reports that a 1993 Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention study
identifies four indicators of future delinquency: "(1) impoverished upbringing, (2) substandard housing and health care, (3) inadequate education, and (4) serious domestic
problems ranging from parental absence and neglect to physical and sexual abuse." See
id; see also Delbert Pruitt, Juvenile Transfer in Capital Cases: Rehabilitation by
Execution?, KY CHILDREN'S RIGHTS J. 1, 3 (Summer 1989) (stating that "as a general
rule, past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Rather than the seriousness
of the crime, the number of contacts that a juvenile has had with the juvenile justice
system is a far better predictor of recidivism.").
202. See Clarke, supra note 133 at 20.
203. See Bishop, supra note 48 at 183; see also Fagan, supra note 53 at 408; see also
Lotke & Schiraldi, supra note 133.
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with the accountability society views as necessary to address
juvenile delinquency.
The Montana Legislature's decision to amend the EJPA
clearly shows that it believes blended sentencing is a positive
alternative to dealing with delinquent youth.
Prior
constitutional deficiencies have been removed, allowing the
EJPA to be a useful intermediate sentencing choice for youth
court judges.
The juvenile system is evolving and Montana is attempting
to evolve with it. Preventing delinquency and providing a
system where children can learn to change their behavior
thereby becoming productive members of society is the goal of
the juvenile system. The more delinquent youths we keep in the
juvenile system, the less likely we, as a society, are creating an
inevitable path of adult criminal behavior. Montana's Extended
Jurisdiction Prosecution Act does not provide overzealous
prosecutors and judges with a 'bigger stick,' it provides troubled
kids a last chance at life.
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